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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - WAIVER AND EXECUTION:
ARGUMENTS FROM CONTINENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
SOVEREIGN immunity from both jurisdiction and execution has traditionally
been accorded foreign sovereigns by domestic courts in the United States,
England and Europe, as a result of judicial views of the requisites of inter-
national law and of international relations. Although these immunities - re-
jected in theory by Vattel and Bynkershoek even before their crystallization
in judicial doctrine " - have been increasingly circumscribed by European
and American courts, the constricted boundaries of immunity that have emerged
are often criticized as too inclusive. In the United States, execution against
the property of a foreign sovereign is all but impossible, and jurisdictional
immunity remains a major barrier to the judicial determination of the obliga-
tions of foreign states to private parties. It may not be politically or judicially
feasible at present to redefine the scope of sovereign immunity, but it is possible
to relax the rules governing the application of immunity. The adoption of a
permissive rule of waiver of sovereign immunity from both jurisdiction and
execution, and the sanction of judicial execution against the property of a
foreign state in all cases where that state is amenable to jurisdiction would
enable American courts not only to shape their doctrine to the form prevalent
among the majority of countries today, but also to pioneer in subverting a
doctrine rapidly becoming an anachronism.
SOVEREIGN ImMUNITY - DocTRINE AND POLIcY
Sovereign immunity in its absolute form entitles a foreign state to immunity
from jurisdiction and execution in all disputes before domestic courts.2 This
doctrine, formulated in the middle of the nineteenth century, was shortly found
unsatisfactory by many states," and has been subjected to widespread criticism
1. VATTr LE DRorr DES Gaws bk. IV, Ch. VIII, §§ 110-15 (1758) (sovereigns and
diplomatic agents are immune from suit in foreign countries only insofar as their public
and official acts are concerned) ; BYNxERSHOEN, TRMrrA fu jua compErENT DES AaMDAs-
sADEuRs (Barbeyrac transl. 1737) (the rationale behind the jurisdictional immunity granted
ambassadors does not apply to personal sovereigns or to states).
2. The first judicial expression of this doctrine is to be found in The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The doctrine vas developed most
fully, however, in English law. The Porto Alexandre, [1920] P. 30 (CA.). See Fitz-
maurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts, XIV Bm. YB. INT ' L
101, 124 (1933).
3. The absolute doctrine was rejected by the Italian courts in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. ALLEN, THE PosmoN OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATiOnAL CoUars
221-29 (1933). The highest court of Belgium took a similar position in Socid Anon)me
des Chemins de Fer Li~geois-Luxembourgeois v. Etat NWerlandais, Cour de Cassation,
June 11, 1903, [1903] Pasicrisie beige [hereinafter cited as P.B.] L 294 (Bel).
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by courts and scholars.4 The creators of the superseding rule of restrictive
immunity - which delimits areas in which the foreign sovereign, notwith-
standing its express reluctance, is held subject to the jurisdiction of domestic
courts - recognized that the template of classical immunity was not suited
for the new mold of state activities, which have expanded to embrace the
whole of international commerce.Y But they failed to provide the doctrinal
foundation necessary to support a judicial policy in harmony with contemporary
political and economic realities; in fact, for traditional state activities, where
immunity was to continue, the principle behind classical immunity was re-
tained intact.6
Historically, the immunity of the foreign state was derived both from the
immunity of its ambassadors and from the state's sovereign nature.7 Logic
was thought to require that the state which appoints the ambassador enjoy
immunity coextensive with that of its diplomatic agent.8 The inadequacy of
this argument was recognized as early as the eighteenth century:
The immunity of the diplomatic agent subjects his creditors to only mod-
erate inconvenience: they can always sue the ambassador in the country
he represents; . .. [his immunity lasts] only as long as his mission. If
[the ambassador] ... abuses his privilege, they can have recourse to the
sovereign on whom he is dependent. But when the State refuses [to sub-
mit to] foreign jurisdiction, it is an immeasurable inconvenience for its
creditors: its tribunals are suspect because they are both judge and party;
its immunity is not for a period, but forever; while the State watches
over [its] ambassador [and] . . . prevents the abuse of his immunity,
nothing superior to the State controls and moderates its [exercise of
this privilege]. 9
4. E.g., Lalive, L'nmunitW de juridiction des Etats et des organisalions internationales,
84 REcUEIL DES CouRs 205 (1953) ; Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional hinmlnif
ties of Foreign States, XXVIII BRIT. Ya. INT'L L. 220 (1951). See authorities cited In
SUCHARITIUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 265-
67 nn.32-74 (1959). See also cases cited note 5 infra.
Despite this criticism, the classic doctrine has retained far more vitality than the laissez-
faire economic order in which it was established. The classic doctrine in its original form
still prevails in England. See SWEENEY, POLICY RESEARCH STUDY, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAw OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dep't of State)
(Oct., 1963), 38-39. It was not officially renounced by the United States Department of
State until 1952. Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
5. E.g., Monnoyer et Bernard v. Etat franqais, Tribunal Civil de Charlerol, April 18,
1927, [1927] P.B. III. 129, 131 (Bel.); Union des R6publiques Socialistes Sovi6tiques v.
Association France-Export, Cour de Cassation (Chambre des requites), Feb. 19, 1929,
[1930] Sirey Recueil G~n~ral [hereinafter cited as S.] 1. 49, 51 (Fr.).
6. E.g., Etienne v. Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, Tribunal Commercial de La Rochelle,
Oct. 31, 1947, [1948] Dalloz Jurisprudence 84 (Fr.); Epoux Martin v. Banque d'Espagne,
Cour de Cassation (Ire ch. civ.), Nov. 3, 1952, 42 REvUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Pa-vP 425 (1953) (Fr.).
7. de Lapradelle, La Saisie des fonds russes d Berlin, 6 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
nnivt 779, 780-88 (1910). The immunity of the state can be traced most directly, of course,
to that of the personal sovereign, whose immunity was derived, in turn, from that of hIls
ambassadors and from his very nature as a sovereign.
8. Id. at 780.
9. Id. at 781 (author's translation).
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Moreover, while diplomatic immunity is often justified on the ground that
legal proceedings interfere with the performance of the diplomatic mission
and constitute an intolerable inconvenience, such considerations do not apply
in the case of a foreign state.10
Nor does the amorphous concept of sovereign nature give rise to more
persuasive arguments for immunity.1 Initially, the appeal to sovereign dig-
nity raises an archaic specter given little credit today and incapable of pro-
viding a rational basis for immunity. It hardly seems consistent with sovereign
dignity for a state "to acquire a tramp steamer and to compete with ordinary
shippers ... in the markets of the world."'12 With the expansion of state par-
ticipation in economic affairs, the sovereign is more and more frequently soiling
its hands in such undignified activities. 13 Even apart from such practical con-
siderations, it is arguable that the dignity of a state is no more impaired by
its being subject to foreign law than by its subjection to its own law.14
The doctrine of the equality and reciprocal independence of foreign states15
- no state is superior to another and all states are absolutely independent of
one another - is likewise an unsatisfactory basis for sovereign immunity.
The equality of states requires only the same privileges for all states; it does
not determine the number and extent of these privileges.1 The recognition of
sovereign immunity, moreover, thwarts rather than furthers attainment of
the desired equality. Acquiescence in the foreign state's claim to immunity
merely shifts the burden of sustaining the economic loss to the private party
and, in most cases, eventually to the forum state.17 The independence of a
state, in addition, is a relative concept, at least without its borders.' 8 To rely
10. Id. at 782.
11. See, e.g., the argument of the "first defendant" as expressed by the court in Soco-
beige v. Etat hellknique, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951, [1953] S. IV. 1, 2-10
(Bel.).
12. Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S.S. Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 521.
13. "The participation of States in foreign trade is by no means an unprecedented
phenomenon. Before the nineteenth century sovereigns and States had participated in in-
ternational trade on an extensive scale. It was only during the nineteenth century that
State-trading reached a low ebb." SUCH=ArrKuL op. cit. jupra note 4, at 14.
14. Both the United States and England have waived immunity from suit in their own
courts for a broad variety of disputes. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-77
(1958); Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44. See Comment, 63 YALE L.J.
1148, 1160 n.72 (1954). France, Belgium, and Italy also permit suits against the govern-
ment in their administrative tribunals (France) and courts (Belgium and Italy), ALLWx.
op. cit. stpra note 3, at 149, 187-89, 221.
15. This doctrine is often referred to in Roman guise: par in parent non habet un-
periur.
16. de Lapradelle, supra note 7, at 783.
17. See, e.g., Socobelge v. Etat hellinique, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951,
[1953] S. IV. 1, 7 (Bel).
The economic loss will not affect the economy of the forum state, however, if the activ-
ities of the private party are in no way connected to the economy of the state in which
suit is prosecuted.
18. Id. at 9.
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on the reciprocal independence of states is to ignore a correlative principle of
reciprocity of more-than equal importance today - the interdependence of
states.19 The encouragement of legal and economic interactions between states
is an interest common to all states. The maintenance of these interactions,
however, becomes impossible if international transactions are not subject to
ordering principles. Until international tribunals are given sufficient authority
by states to apply such principles, the international activities of sovereigns
must be governed by the rules of international law - private and public -
'as applied by national courts. The concept of interdependence thus requires
that the independence of states be viewed as limited rather than absolute.
And the doctrine of sovereign immunity which would place each state beyond
the jurisdiction of every other state is inconsistent with this prevalent concept
of limited independence.
The historical justifications for sovereign immunity, then, fail to provide
adequate. support for the doctrine. Sovereign immunity, moreover, is in con-
tradiction to the emergent principle of legality.20 This principle, which requires
that states as well as individuals be subject to the rule of law, is based in large
part on considerations of equity and justice. The acceptance of this principle
is illustrated by the- fact that domestic sovereign immunity has atrophied to
the point where the individual can enforce substantial legal rights against
the state in its own courts.21 The growing recognition of the individual as a
-subject of international law and of a broad application of the principle of
legality to problems concerning respect for and protection of the rights of
the individual,2 2 implies the admission by states of legal responsibility for
their acts before all tribunals with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy.23 Only the total subordination to legality - "the transformation
from l'Etat-Puissance to Etat de droit" - can negate the initial and unavoid-
able imbalance in any confrontation between a state and a private party.2 4
19. de Lapradelle, supra note 7, at 783. Cf. MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN TIME
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER passinm (1960).
20. Lalive, supra note 4, at 214-22. See also Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 232-36.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. One of the "Purposes of the United Nations" is:
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encourag-
ing respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distine-
tion as to race, sex, language or religion ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 3. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 13, 1 1 and art. 62, 2. The broad
purposes evidenced by the Charter are incompatible with a state's avoiding the adjudication
of claims against it by means of sovereign immunity. See also JEssup, A MODrRN LAW
OF NATIoN s 94-122 (1948).
23. Sovereign immunity, unlike the immunity afforded a private party because of some
nation's "acts of state," is an immunity from jurisdiction over the person - a status iu-
munity. See Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1929). Cf. FALIC, Tun ROLE o
DoMEsTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 139-45 (1964).
24. Carabiber, L'arbitrage international entre gouvernemnents el partieulers, 76 RE-"
CUEIL.DES CouRs 217, 222 (1950).
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.The current doctrine of restrictive immunity, prevalent in Continental juris-
dictions and formally endorsed.by the United States Department of State in
the Tate Letter,m may be seen as a partial response to the principle of legality.
This doctrine is concerned not with compelling universal submission to juris-
diction, but with delineating situations in which immunity is not to be granted fG
the absolute doctrine is not ignored, but merely viewed from a different per-
spective. Restrictive immunity postulates that the fundamental relationship
of states is not one of reciprocal independence, but one of mutual respect for
sovereignty 27 Continental courts, utilizing a narrow definition of "sovereignty"
have established a broad, if poorly defined, class of activities (jure gestionis)
in which the state is said to be acting as a private party rather than as a
sovereign, and is therefore not entitled to immunity.m In its public activities
(jure imperii) the state retains its immunity."
Because restrictive immunity relies in large part on the concepts underlying
absolute immunity, it is subject to many of the criticisms applicable to the
absolute doctrine. For example, the immunity granted by the restrictive theory
is premised upon a respect for sovereignty; but any immunity is inconsistent
with the respect for the individual demanded by the principle of legality.
Moreover, although the restrictive theory reflects an awareness of the desira-
bility of encouraging economic and legal interdependence among states, it
25. The United States formally adopted the restrictive theory in 1952. In a letter to
the Attorney General, the Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, Jack B. Tate,
stated: "
The reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in adhering to the
[absolute] theory with increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States
should change its policy .... [T]he Department feels that the widespread and in-
creasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities
makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts.
26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 984, 985 (1952). The Supreme Court, however, has yet to make any
pronouncement with respect to restrictive immunity.
26. By its very terms, the restrictive theory seeks only to delimit the class of state
activities which fall outside the competence of domestic courts. In recent years, this class
has been considerably narrowed. The purchase of rice by a foreign government for free dis-
tribution to its civilian population and military personnel during time of war has been held
to be a nonsovereign act. New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co. v. Korea, 132 F. Supp.
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Socit immobili~re v. Etats-Unis, Cour d'Appel de Paris,
March 16, 1960, 89 CLUNEr 132 (1962) (Fr.).
.27. Socobelge v. Etat hell~nique, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951, [1953]
S. IV. 1, 9 (Bel.).
28. See, e.g., Etat Roumain v. Socitd A. Pascalet et Cie., Tribunal de Commerce de
Marseille, Feb. 12, 1924, [1924] Dalloz Hebdomadaire [hereinafter cited as Dalloz Hebd.]
260 (Fr.); cases cited note 5 supra. The Uftited States has adopted a similar approach in
the context of domestic sovereign immunity. Cf. Bank of the United States Y. Planter's
Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824) ; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1877).
And the distinction between the public and private acts of a foreign sovereign has been
incorporated into American doctrine by the Tale Letter, 26 DuE'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
29. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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fails to achieve fully this goal. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies when the restrictive theory was first developed, the definitional basis
of this theory - sovereign or nonsovereign activities - was susceptible of
easy application and served to distinguish the commercial from the noncom-
mercial activities of the state.3 0 At that time, the theory was in accord with
the goal of maintaining and encouraging economic interactions on an inter-
national level. But with the increasing economic role of the state, the public-
private distinction has become correspondingly more difficult to drawa1 and
it no longer seems germane to the characterization of the state's activity as
commercial or noncommercial 3 2 Finally, the prerequisites for a well-function-
ing international economy are independent of the personages who engage in
international commercial transactions; the accident of public control of com-
mercial operations cannot confer a privileged status through exemption from
legal responsibility if interdependence is to be realized.33 No one doubts that
a state is competent to enter into commercial obligations. 4 Once bound by
contract, the parties should be able to act in reliance on their mutual promises.
A commercial transaction worthy of the confidence of its parties must create
genuine shared expectations as to performance, and as to fair and certain
remedy in case of breach. Similarly, when a foreign government commits a
tort in connection with a commercial activity, the injured party must be able
to rely on recovery or he will abstain from all commercial activities where
the possibility of such harm is great.
30. During the laissez-faire era, states seldom engaged in commercial activities. The
limited activities of states outside of the traditional governmental functions of preserving
order, safeguarding the homeland and the like made relatively easy the demarcation of acts
jure imperii and jure gestionis.
31. Lauterpacht, for one, thinks the distinction entirely unworkable. Lauterpaclt, supra
note 4, at 222-26. See also SUCHARtrKUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 267.
The distinction between the public and private activities of a state for the purposes of
suit is by no means a new one. "[I]n the Roman Empire, where governmental authority
was exalted to the highest degree, the state in its property relationships was suable in the
courts!' Setser, The Immunities of the State and Government Economic Activities, 24
LAv & CONTEMP. PROB. 291, 293 (1959). The most important of the recent doctrinal
approaches are summarized in Lalive, supra note 4, at 257-72.
32. Concentration on the metaphysical question of when a sovereign is not a sovereign
has obstructed a serious examination of whether or not the activity involved should be
immune. In Soci~t6 Bauer-Marchal v. Ministre des Finances de Turquie, Cour d'Appel de
Paris, Jan. 29, 1957, 84 CLuNET 392 (1957) (Fr.), a French company sued for a sum due
on bonds issued by the City of Constantinople and guaranteed by the Imperial Ottoman
government. The court allowed the guarantor immunity for its "public act" and did not
stop to consider whether the act of signing as guarantor constituted a waiver of sovereign
immunity. See text at notes 52-82 in! ra. The case was reversed by the Cour de Cassation
on the grounds that the lower court did not state why the guaranty of the loan was a pub-
lic act. Cour de Cassation, Dec. 19, 1961, [1962] Gazette du Palais 186 (March 17-20).
33. FRIEDmANx, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 352 (1964),
34. "The fact that [the state] ... may not be sued without its consent is a matter of
procedure which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts." Perry
v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353-54 (1935).
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Despite the fact that the logical extension of the principle of legality and
the needs of international commerce would be the abolition of sovereign im-
munity,35 other policy considerations, shared in by all states, may dictate the
granting of immunity.ss Immunity might be thought desirable, for example,
where necessary for the continued maintenance of friendly relations between
the forum state and the foreign state ;3 where considered advisable as a meas-
ure to support the stability and functioning of the foreign government and
where necessary to protect the lives, property and welfare of citizens of the
forum state.3 9
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
Closely related to the question of how much immunity is to be accorded
the foreign sovereign is the question of what conduct of the foreign sovereign
will constitute an irrevocable waiver of immunity or, phrased alternatively,
will be treated as a binding consent to jurisdiction. Anglo-American and Euro-
pean courts have consistently held that the immunity of the foreign sovereign
from jurisdiction may be waived, either expressly or tacitly.4 0 Often the ex-
35. The evolution from absolute to restrictive immunity itself represents a major step
toward a flexible doctrine responsive to the needs of a world order of interdependent states.
See, e.g., Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56
Nw. ULL. REV. 109, 111-13 (1961). The restrictive theory has been endorsed by many
authoritative advisory bodies. E.g., Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Con-
vention on Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L SUPP.
451, 456-57 (1932) ; REsolutions adopties par Institut ! la Session d'Aix-en-Provencei 22
avril- 1 mai 1954, 45 AxNuA= DE LIzqsITUT DE DRorr INTERNATxONAL Bk. II, 293-94
(1954).
36. For the special relevance of foreign policy to the judicial doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the United States, see Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1945); Com-
ment, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 1155-59 (1954).
In the United States, as in other countries, the executive plays an important role in the
enunciation of such policy considerations. In the light of the principles which militate
against immunity, it would seem that this role should be narrowly defined. Cf. Zander,
The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826, 852 (1959) ; Cardozo, Sovereign lin-
miunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HAav. L REv. 603 (1954); Jessup,
Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 163 (1946).
37. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) ; Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197
F. Supp. 710, 714 (E.D. Va. 1961).
38. See Royal Italian Government v. National Brass & Copper Tube Co., 294 Fed. 23,
27 (2d Cir. 1923); Carabiber, Le concept des itnininit~s de juridietion doit-il itre rcvWs
et dans quel sens , 79 CLuxEr 440, 464 (1952).
39. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961). See also notes
146-49 infra and accompanying text
40. See Cohn, Waiver of Inmunity, 34 BRrr. Ya. INT'L. L 260, 264-66 (1958). In
England, unlike on the Continent, waiver of immunity cannot take place prior to judicial
proceedings. See notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text American law is unclear on the
same subject. See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text European doctrine is, how-
ever, clear that tacit but certain waiver is binding. See, e.g, Brasseur %. La R~publique
Hell6nique et Socidt6 "Socober", Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, May 24, 1933, [1933] P.B. II
197 (Bel.) ; Hanuklew v. Minstre de l'Afghanistan, Cour de Cassation (Cass. Req.), Jan.
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istence of such waiver, though not necessarily the extent thereof, is determined
by the relevant procedural rules of the applicable domestic law. Thus, in the
United States a foreign sovereign waives immunity by bringing an action,
41
by entering a general appearance, "or by acts or conduct inconsistent with a
special appearance entered solely for the purpose of raising a jurisdictional
issue .... *42 The Supreme Court has also held that a sovereign, which has
entered a general appearance and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, cannot later "reverse the action invoked by it and ... come in and go
out of court at its will .... 43
Despite the agreement of states that immunity may be waived by a general
appearance, there is still some controversy concerning the possibility of waiver
of sovereign immunity - by contractual agreement or other acts - prior
to the commencement of judicial proceedings. Continental courts, utilizing the
rule of prorogatio fori, whereby jurisdiction over private parties otherwise
lacking is created by voluntary submission, have uniformly held that binding
waiver of immunity - express or implied - can be agreed upon in advance
between a foreign state and a private party.4 4 Such waiver vests jurisdiction
23, 1933, [1933] S. I. 249 (Fr.). It is interesting to note that communist countries, while
agreeing with England that sovereign immunity should be absolute, may allow prior
waiver. Zourek, Quelques observations sur les difficuts rencontrtes lors da riqlemcnt
jidicaire des diffirends nes du commerce entre les pays o structure Cconomiques el sociales
diffirentes, 86 CLUNET 638, 652, 658-62 (1959).
41. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). Private defendants
may perhaps be allowed to assert affirmative as well as defensive counterclaims.
While a court may have no power to enforce an affirmative judgment against a
sovereign state, still if, as a defense to a suit instituted by a sovereign state, a
counterclaim or set-off is asserted, it would seem only proper that the court deter-
mine all issues fairly before it, even though it involve a finding that the plaintiff
state was indebted to the defendant.
The Gloria, 286 Fed. 188, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Accord, Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S,
Int'l Sales Corp., 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960). But see In re Patterson-MacDonald
Shipbuilding Co., 293 Fed. 192 (9th Cir. 1923) ; The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
The question of affirmative judgment on a counterclaim against a sovereign plaintiff was
not before the Supreme Court in National City Bank v. Republic of China, supra, and the
Court has not considered this question since its liberal holding in that case. See text at
notes 88-91 infra.
42. The Ucayali, 47 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. La. 1942).
43. Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 632 (1914).
44. Cohn, supra note 39, at 263-64. The doctrine of express waiver existed in Europe
even before the era of restrictive immunity.
[I)f the principle of the independence of States permits a foreign government to
take exception to the competence of French tribunals even over the performance of
obligations entered into by ... [the foreign government] in France with a French
national, it is still open to that government to accept this jurisdiction, and the power
of the court to execute a judgment, and even to submit to it in advance at the time
of the contract; such a stipulation constitutes an essential element of the contract,
and, once given, cannot be withdrawn at the whim of ... [the government].
Rochaid-Dahdah v. Gouvernement tunisien, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, April 10, 1888, 15
CLUNEr 670, 671 (1888) (Fr.) (author's translation).
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in the state to whose courts the parties have agreed to submit their disputes.
The English rule, diametrically opposed to the Continental one, is that a prior
waiver is not binding on a foreign sovereign.4 The leading recent English
case on prior waiver is Kahan v. Pakistan Federation." Kahan, a British
citizen, entered into a contract with Pakistan for the supply of Sherman tanks.
The contract contained the following clause:
The interpretation and effect of this agreement shall be construed and
governed by English law .... The Government agrees to submit for the
purposes of this agreement to the jurisdiction of the English courts.47
Kahan brought suit for breach of the contract, and the Pakistani government
issued a summons to set aside the writ insofar as it was impleaded. The Court
of Appeal held:
[A] mere agreement by a foreign sovereign to submit to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this country is wholly ineffective if the foreign sovereign
chooses to resile from it. Nothing short of an actual submission to the
jurisdiction . . . will suffice.48
It should be noted, however, that the English rule denying binding effect
to waivers inter partes is not applied only to foreign sovereigns, but is a pro-
cedural rule applicable to all litigants before the English courts4 0
Because of the paucity of decisions considering prior waiver of jurisdictional
immunity, 50 and because much of what has been said is dicta,5 1 there is no con-
trolling American doctrine on this question. In the context of transactions
wholly between private parties, American law - like Continental but unlike
English law - gives binding effect to prior consent to jurisdiction, 2 To the
extent that in both English and Continental tribunals the law governing the
effect of a foreign sovereign's prior waiver of immunity is derived from rules
of procedure applicable to suits between private litigants, it would seem that
45. Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B. 149 (CA.).
46. [1951] 2 K.B. 1003 (C.A.).
47. Id. at 1003. There was also a provision for service of process in London on the
High Commissioner for Pakistan in the United Kingdom. In common-law jurisdictions it
is almost impossible to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state without consent
to service. See text at notes 77-82 infra.
48. [1951] 2 K.B. at 1012.
49. Cohn, mpra note 39, at 263.
50. One of the few cases decided on this question follows the English rule. Lamont v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E2d 81 (1939). But more recent cases do not cite
either Laniont or the English cases.
51. E.g., Et Ve Balk Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 204 N.Y.S.2d 971, 977
(Sup. Ct 1960); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div.
189,201-02, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825, 837-38 (1940).
52. See, e.g., Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div.
189, 201-02, 20 N.Y.S2d 825, 837-38 (1940). On the other hand, New York courts have
also interpreted narrowly provisions applying to the construction of a contract according
to the law of New York. Such a provision is said not to constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity. Frazier v. Hanover Banl, 204 Misc. 922, 925-26, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323 (Sup.
Ct 1953).
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American jurisdictions should follow the Continental practice. Additional
reasons for the adoption of the Continental position by American courts may
be found in the fact that prior waivers in public loan agreements and treaties
are given binding effect by the courts of most countries. Since the Netherlands
loan of 1945, Continental and American courts have held binding contractual
waivers of immunity by borrower governments in international commercial
loan agreements"" The necessity for according binding effect to such waivers
is demonstrated by the fact that such waivers are demanded by international
lendersAr It would be anomalous if prior contractual waiver in the area of
public loans, traditionally denominated as immune, should be held binding,
whereas waiver in the context of other commercial transactions more easily
characterized as jure gestionis may be rescinded at the will of the sovereign.
Similarly, contractual waiver of immunity for the benefit of private parties
by treaty or other international agreement is not uncommonm It has never
been suggested that a signatory to such an agreement, or indeed a state which
merely unilaterally declares its intention not to claim immunity 60 - as did
the United States with respect to commercial shipping - may when sued
reverse its position and claim immunity.5 7
Not only authority, but also policy requires that waiver prior to proceedings
be held binding on the foreign state. The same principles of equity and justice
which forbid a state to assert immunity once it has been waived by general
53. 1961 PROCEEDINGs, AmERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 131-36. As early
as 1888, some European courts upheld as binding a contractual consent to jurisdiction in
a government loan agreement. See, e.g., Rochaid-Dalidah v. Gouvernement tunisien, Tri-
bunal Civil de la Seine, April 10, 1888, 15 CLNET 670 (1888) (Fr.).
54. Cohn, supra note 40, at 272-73.
55. E.g., Economic agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, Oct. 12, 1925,
cert. 7, 53 L.N.T.S. 85, at 101 (No. 1257) (1926) ; Agreement with the Netherlands, June
19, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1610, T.I.A.S. No. 2828; Brussels Convention, April 10, 1926,
art. 1, 176 L.N.T.S. 201, at 205 (1937) ; Agreement between France and the Soviet Union,
Dec. 29, 1945, art. 11, 36 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL raivL- 468, 471 (1947),
Agreement between Hungary and Switzerland, June 27, 1950, art. 15, 82 Entscheidungen
Des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes [hereinafter cited as S.B.G.] 75, at 87 (1956)
(Swit.). The United States has entered into a number of treaties of friendship, commerce
and navigation. A representative clause in the treaty with Greece states:
No enterprise of either Party which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it
engages in commercial ... or other business activities within the territories of the
other Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity therein
from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned
and controlled enterprises are subject therein.
Treaty with Greece, Aug. 3 and Dec. 26, 1951, art. 14, 1 5, [1954] 5 U.S.T. 1829, at 1867,
T.I.A.S. No. 3057. For a suggested interpretation of the Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation Treaties, see Setser, The Immunity Waiver for State-Controlled Business Enter-
prises in United States Commercial Treaties, 1961 PROCEED NGS, AMERICAN SocIrET oF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-105.
56. See note 25 supra.
57. The United States did not sign the Brussels convention because it claimed it had
already adopted the practice of not claiming immunity for its commercial ships. SUCIIARIT-
xxn, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98-99.
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appearance seem applicable in the case of waiver prior to suit. In addition,
the foreknowledge by parties to a contract that a waiver of jurisdictional im-
munity embodied in the agreement binds the contracting state will provide
greater security and will presumably lead to increased commercial transactions
between states and individuals.
The effective use of waiver as a doctrine to curtail immunity has been
made possible not only by holding -waiver irrevocable, but also by broadening
the class of acts said to constitute waiver. Indeed, on the Continent the trans-
ition from absolute to restrictive immunity was largely accomplished by means
of the doctrine of implied waiver of immunityr s Continental courts found, at
an early date, an actual intention to submit to jurisdiction,69 from the very
nature of the activities of the trading state. Then, as pressure further to
constrict sovereign immunity increased, the courts became more willing to
imply waiver as a matter of law regardless of intent.P° As the patterns of be-
havior legally equivalent to waiver became established, the parties engaging in
such behavior did so with notice, and the line between implied in law and
implied in fact waiver became blurred. For example, European courts have
long held that a foreign sovereign with an ownership interest in immovables
within the forum state has automatically waived immunity with respect to
disputes concerning that interest.61
In the United States, there seems to have been no judicial recognition of
implied prior waiver, either in law or in fact. But a recent Second Circuit
case portends the adoption of implied waiver of immunity as an American
as well as a European doctrine. In Victory Transport, Inc. v. Conzisarta Gen-
eral de Abastecimientos y Transportes,02 the Comisaria General, a branch of
the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, voyage-chartered the S.S. Hudson from
its owner, Victory Transport, to carry a cargo of surplus wheat from a safe
United States Gulf port to one or two safe Spanish ports. The wheat was
58. Cohn, supra note 40, at 260-61.
59. E.g., Rochaid-Dahdah v. Gouvernement tunisien, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, April
10, 1888, 15 CLuNrr 670, 671 (1888).
60. E.g., Etat roumain v. Socit6 A. Pascalet, Tribunal de Commerce de Mfarseille,
Feb. 12, 1924, [1924] Dalloz Hebd. 260 (Fr.). A French company brought an action for
moneys owing to it under a contract of sale by which Roumania had purchased diverse
merchandise destined to be resold to its inhabitants. The court, characterizing the act as
a private rather than a public one, held that tacit waiver of immunity from jurisdiction
could be deduced from the fact that the foreign state contracted in France with a French
citizen. As additional indicia of waiver, the court cited the facts that both the bonds to
ensure payment for delivery and the supplementary bonds stipulating payment in pounds
outside of Roumania were signed in Paris. In cases such as this, the line between implied
in law waiver and no immunity at all is so faint as to be practically indistinguishable.
61. E.g., Solon v. Gouvernement Egyptien, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, April 16, 1847,
[1849] Dalloz L 7 (Note) (Fr.) ; Etat de Sutde v. Petrocochino, Oct. 30, 1929, Tribunal
Civil de la Seine, [1930] Daloz Hebd. 15 (Fr.). See also ALLM, op. ct. supra note 3, at
15-17.
62. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filcd, 33 U.S.L. NVFs 3233 (U.S.
Jan. 7, 1965) (No. 815).
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consigned to and shipped by a private commercial concern. 03 The ship sus-
tained severe hull damage during the discharge of its cargo at the Spanish
ports. Victory Transport, claiming that the damage sustained was caused
by the Comisaria General's breach of the charter party's safe port/safe berth
warranty, demanded payment of its claims, and, thereafter, the submission of
the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the standard New York arbi-
tration clause contained in the agreement. This clause provided:
Should any dispute arise between Owners and the Charterers, the matter
in dispute shall be referred to three persons at New York ... their de-
cision or that of any two of them shall be final, and for the purpose of
enforcing any award, this agreement may be made a rule of the Court,0
When the Comisaria General failed to comply with Victory Transport's de-
mands, the latter brought proceedings to compel arbitration under Section 4
of the United States Arbitration Act. 5 Victory Transport, pursuant to an
ex parte order of the district court, served process by registered mail at the
Comisaria General's Madrid office. The Comisaria General moved to dismiss
the petition claiming invalid service of process and sovereign immunityG0
63. The wheat was sold pursuant to the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act, 68 Stat. 454, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1724 (1954). The effectuation of the sale
through private trade channels, as was done in this case, is specifically envisaged and
encouraged by the act. 68 Stat. 455, 7 U.S.C. § 1701(b).
64. 336 F.2d at 356 n.2.
65. A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any court of the United
States which, save for such agreement would have jurisdiction under Title 28, In
a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the con-
troversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of such
application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made
in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure....
61 Stat. 671 (1947), as amended, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958). It is important to note that the suit
did not concern the enforcement of an arbitration award. If there were no further appeal
of the case, and the Comisaria General continued in its refusal to appoint arbitrators, Vie-
tory Transport might apply to the court to appoint arbitrators for the Comisaria General.
61 Stat. 671, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1958). No case has been discovered in which a United States
court has acted to appoint arbitrators for a foreign sovereign or its official agency.
This case raises the interesting question, not discussed by the court, of whether the
United States Arbitration Act was intended by Congress to apply to foreign states or their
agencies. Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (The Jones Act does not apply to
a foreign seaman injured on a foreign ship in a United States port.) ; McCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (The jurisdictional pro-
visions of the National Labor Relations Act do not extend to the maritime operations of
foreign ships employing foreign seamen.). The United States Arbitration Act has been
applied however, to foreign private corporations. Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de
Navegacion de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957); Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v.
Eastern States Petroleum Corp., 284 F2d 419 (2d Cir. 1960).
66. The Comisaria General also argued that the designation of the ports as safe was an
official Act of State and could not be examined by the court. Brief for Respondent-Appel-
lant, pp. 5-7, Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
[Vol. 74.- 887
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
After an adverse decision in the district court, the Comisaria General ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit. The opinion of the circuit court proceeded as
follows: the Comisaria General, as a state instrumentality, is a member of
the class of juristic entities entitled to claim sovereign immunityY The exe-
cution of the charter party and the warranty of the Spanish ports as safe,
however, were commercial and nonsovereign acts for which the Comisaria
General was not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction under the terms of the
restrictive theory.6 The court therefore found it unnecessary to consider
whether the charter party by its terms implied a waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court then found that the district court had obtained in personam juris-
diction through the plaintiff's valid service of process. In reaching this con-
clusion the Second Circuit found an implied consent to jurisdiction for pur-
poses of service of process, which is conceptually similar to the implied waiver
of jurisdictional immunity developed by the Continental courts. According
to the court, the tacit consent to service of process was embodied in the ar-
bitration clause in the charter party and in the federal statute governing ar-
portes, 336 F2.d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). The court disposed of the argument summarily. 336
F2d at 362-63.
67. Continental courts applying the restrictive theory normally deny sovereign im-
munity from jurisdiction to state trading agencies. E.g., Union des Rdpubliques Socialistes
Sovintiques v. Association France-Export, Cour de Cassation (Chambre des Requites),
Feb. 19, 1929, [1930] S. I. 49, 51 (Fr.) (Immunity denied to the Soviet Trade Delegation
in France). The rationale behind this doctrine has been cogently stated by Niboyet in a
Note to a recent French case.
All international commerce would become impossible if the subject matter of these
activities were necessarily reserved for the tribunals of the interested State. This
has been well understood by the Soviet Union which, while nationalizing its foreign
trade, has recognized the competence of the tribunals [of the country] where its
trade delegations are established.
Etat Roumain v. Aricastre, Cour d'Appel de Bourdeaux, June 16, 1949, [1950] S. IL 141
(Fr.) (note Niboyet) (author's translation). The criteria for immunity applied to state
agencies by the European courts is that the agency not possess a legal personality distinct
from that of the state, or, even if such distinction exists, that the agency perform a dele-
gated act of sovereignty. Passelaigues v. Banque hypothdcaire de Norv~ge, Tribunal Civil
de la Seine, June 16, 1955, [1956] Dalloz Sommaire 39 (Fr.).
English courts have assigned relatively little importance to the e-istence of a separate
legal personality apart from the state. Krajina v. The Tass Agency, [1949] 2 All E.R.
274 (C.A.); Baccus S.R-L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438 (CA.).
American courts have traditionally made use of one criterion alone - whether the state
agency is incorporated. Coale v. Socid6t Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F2d 180
(Si).N.Y. 1921) ; United States v. Deutches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F2d 199 (S.D.
N.Y. 1929). New York state courts, however, have taken a more liberal view. "[I]t is of
no actual importance whether [defendant] be called... [a corporation] or not. It has all
the characteristics of a corporation. For present purposes the most significant fact is that
the Bank is described in its own charter as 'a distinct legal person." Ulen & Co. v. Bank
Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 206 (1940). See also Hannes
v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940).
68. See notes 5 and 26 supra and accompanying text.
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bitration.69 Given the particular facts of the case, the court's holding of implied
consent seems justified. Although the arbitration agreement did not itself
constitute an express or implied consent to service of process in an action for
its enforcement, it served two important functions: it constituted an agree-
ment to submit all disputes to arbitration in New York, and it provided that
"for the purpose of enforcing any award, [the] agreement may be made a
rule of the court." When these stipulations of the arbitration clause are read
in conjunction with the venue provision of the United States Arbitration Act
making the promise to arbitrate enforceable in the federal district court for
the district in which arbitration was agreed to be held, it seems no large step
to find, as did the Second Circuit, consent to service of process.
Although the court in Victory Transport found consent to jurisdiction for
purposes of service of process, it implied that waiver of sovereign immunity
is a separate question. In footnote 20 of its opinion the court stated:
Since in our view sovereign immunity does not apply, we find it unneces-
sary to consider whether the agreement to arbitrate constituted an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity.70
Analytically, it is possible to distinguish between a foreign state's waiver of
its general immunity from the jurisdiction of an otherwise competent United
States court and its consent to service of process effective where the foreign
state does not benefit from jurisdictional immunity. An agreement by a foreign
state not to assert immunity after it has been brought into court need not
logically embody a submission to the power of a particular court which would
relax the due process requirements of service of process. But rather than fo-
cus on this analytic distinction, the court in Victory Transport changed
its characterization of the Comisaria General from a governmental agency to
a private foreign corporation. The court was thus able to rely on past decisions
concerning a private foreign corporation's consent to service of process in
order to find valid in personam jurisdiction.71 Implicit in the court's reasoning
may be the belief that a foreign sovereign can only waive immunity but cannot
consent to service of process. But if a sovereign, as litigant, is ever subject
to in personam jurisdiction, then there is no reason why it, unlike private
litigants, should be found incapable of consenting to service of process prior
69. The purpose of the United States Arbitration Act was to overcome the commer-
cial inconvenience occasioned by the refusal of the Federal courts to give effective coni-
mon-law or equitable relief for breach of promises to arbitrate. Cavac Compania v. Board
for Validation of German Bonds, 189 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
In a suit against a private foreign company which had also agreed to the New York
arbitration clause the court held that "the parties are presumed to have contracted with
notice of [the United States Arbitration Act]." Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de
Navegacion de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1957). There seems to be no reason why
the presumption of notice should not apply here also. But see note 65 supra.
70. 336 F2d 354, at 362 n.20.
71. Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Navegacion de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342 (2d
Cir. 1957); Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp., 284 F.2d
419 (2d Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 74: 887
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
to suit. It would be incongruous to recognize as binding a waiver of immunity
prior to suit and at the same time to deny the possibility of consent to service
of process.72
Although an analytic distinction can be drawn between waiver of jurisdic-
tional immunity and consent to service of process, the conduct and contractual
language which explicitly or implicitly constitute such waiver or consent are
generally identical. In practice, no specific distinction is made by the foreign
state between the two types of consent, and the possible theoretical difference
is further blurred by the fact that the same facts serve to establish both. Thus
a typical agreement may only provide that all disputes be settled in the courts
of a specified jurisdiction.7" Such an agreement, if it is sufficient to constitute a
consent to service of process, as was the arbitration clause and statute in
Victory Transport, should establish pro tanto a waiver of immunity - the
more general consent to jurisdiction. Likewise, a waiver of jurisdictional im-
munity may be presumed to comprehend an implied consent to jurisdiction
for service of process.
Because of the practical identity of consent to service of process and waiver
of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, Victory Transport represents the
first major step toward the judicial recognition of binding prior waiver by
American courts. That the Second Circuit held binding the consent to service
of process implies that had the Comisaria General been entitled to immunity
under the restrictive theory, this privilege would have been found to have been
waived. In addition, the fact that the consent held binding in Victory Transport
was tacit requires a fortiori that express waiver also be held binding.
Victory Transport also raises the important policy issue of the extent to
which the doctrine of waiver should be used to undercut sovereign immunity.
The consent to service of process by the Comisaria General, derived from the
arbitration clause and the United States Arbitration Act, may be characterized
as implied in fact. Whether the American courts will further emulate their
European counterparts by utilizing implied in lav waivers has yet to be seen.
If this further step is taken, American courts will be able to evade the strictures
72. Had the court's initial characterization of the Comisaria General been that of a
private corporation, then the question of sovereign immunity would not have entered the
case. Even before the United States adopted the restrictive theory, state-owned corpora-
tions were uniformly denied sovereign immunity. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Geselischaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies
Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940). Perhaps the court was afraid that
prior consent of any sort is not binding on a foreign sovereign. If a private litigant is to
rely on the contractual waiver of immunity of a foreign state agency, it should not be
necessary for him first to ascertain whether the foreign agency may be characterized as a
corporation in order to determine whether or not the waiver is binding. Such a task might
require a private seller to inquire into the foreign sovereign buyer's intended use of the
goods sold, or other circumstances surrounding an otherwise valid consent to jurisdiction,
and could easily defeat the very policy consideration of certainty and fairness which under-
lie the doctrine of waiver.
73. See, e.g., text at note 47 supra.
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of the doctrine of restrictive immunity whenever it is thought that the sovereign
should be amenable to jurisdiction. Such use of the fiction of implied in law
waiver, however, is suspect for two reasons: it may be thought undesirable
to do away with restrictive immunity, and, even if not, jurisprudential con-
siderations may militate against so doing by means of an indirect attack using
this fictional device.74 But regardless of the desirability of using implied in
law waiver to attack the restrictive theory, within the framework of that
theory express and implied in fact waiver can serve several useful functions.
Most important, where the restrictive theory would otherwise grant immu-
nity - i.e., in cases where the sovereign acts jure imperii - waiver is the only
path to jurisdiction.7 5 Even where the sovereign is not immune under the re-
strictive theory, waiver of immunity may still be important in establishing
consent to service of process. Finally, in cases where the test of the restrictive
theory - public or private act - is difficult to apply, 0 a finding of waiver
will conveniently moot that problem.
The decision in Victory Transport lends force to the doctrine of waiver
not only directly by recognizing as binding a foreign sovereign's tacit con-
tractual consent to jurisdiction, but also indirectly by holding valid extra-
territorial service of process at the Madrid office of the Comisaria General.
The implication of this latter portion of the court's opinion is that the do-
mestic procedural rules of service of process are applicable to foreign sover-
eigns, and that in personam jurisdiction over the sovereign can be obtained by
means of service of process similar to those employed in domestic cases.
Whereas waiver of jurisdictional immunity and the performance of activities
designated by the restrictive theory as jure gestionis subject the foreign state
to the substantive rules of the forum, under prior case law the spirit of re-
strictive immunity and the effectiveness of waiver had been frustrated by the
virtual impossibility of serving process on a foreign sovereign.77 The difficulty
is well illustrated by Oster v. Dominion of Canada,78 decided several years
ago by a federal district court in New York. Oster brought suit for
damages to his property from a rise in the level of Lake Ontario occasioned
by the construction of a dam on the Canadian side of the St. Lawrence River.
Congress had approved the plans for the Canadian-built dam subject to the
following condition, which was formally accepted by Canada:
That if the construction and operation of the said dam shall cause damage
or detriment to the property of any . . . citizens of the United States,
74. See, e.g., Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL L. Rnv. 363, 513, 877 (1930-31).
75. Such use of factual waiver does not result in undercutting the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the same sense as does implied in law waiver. Where waiver is express or
implied in fact, the sovereign itself, not jurisprudential magic, dissolves the shield ol sov-
ereign immunity.
76. See note 31 supra.
77. E.g., Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
See' generally Griffin, Adjective Law and Practice In Suits Against Foreign Governncnts,
36 TEmp. L.Q. 1 (1962).
78. 144 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1956).
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the government of Canada shall pay such amount of compensation as
may.. . be awarded the said parties in the proper court of the United
States .... 79
Since a judicial determination by a United States court of any amount owing
to an injured party would necessitate Canada's appearance as a party, Canada's
acceptance of the condition would appear to be a tacit consent to both juris-
diction and service of process. Notwithstanding the international agreement,
however, the district court held ineffective the attempt to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over Canada by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint
to the Consul General or his office in New York.
The court in Victory Transport departed from the apparent principle of
Oster by taking advantage of the fact that the Comisaria General is a state
agency rather than a foreign state itself. The court was thus able to character-
ize the Comisaria as a private corporation and to hold it subject to the pro-
cedural rules governing service of process on such entities. The opinion of
the court with its shifting reference from a sovereign to a corporate defendant
gives the appearance of shaping the facts to fit the available rules of service
of process. While the result reached seems desirable, the danger in the court's
treatment is that the basic problem - the lack of statutory techniques for
service of process on foreign sovereigns - is obscured. An alternative reading
of the case, however, might view the court as adopting a flexible interpreta-
tion of the statutory rules to fit the actual facts. Of the juristic entities specified
by the Federal Rules for purposes of service of process, 0 the foreign corpora-
tion is most similar to the Comisaria General. The court accordingly can be
viewed as holding that the method provided for service of process on foreign
corporations was applicable to the Spanish state agency as well.8 ' This latter
alternative, indeed, is one of two possible strategies - albeit the less desirable
to insure that a sovereign as well as its agent is not accorded practical
79. Id. at 747.
80. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d).
81. The result reached in the case is noteworthy not only for its break with precedent,
but also for the added force it gives to the Tate Letter and the doctrine of restrictive
immunity in the United States. The Tate Letter does not consider the question of service
of process on a foreign State. Under current law, there seems to be no way to acquire in
personam jurisdiction over a foreign State unless the State willingly makes a general
appearance in court. The law prior to Victory Transport was clear that in personam juris-
diction could not be acquired by personal service on a government official even if that
government had waived its sovereign immunity. "Consent to the jurisdiction of ... [a]
court over the person ... does not embody or imply consent to the service of process in any
manner or in any territory." Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126,
W (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F2d 93 (7th Cir. 1964);
Letter of Aug. 10, 1964 from Acting Legal Advisor Leonard Meeker to Assistant Attorney
General John Douglas, 59 Am J. Ix'L L. 110-11 (1965).
In Continental courts, more permissive (in the context of sovereign immunity) juris-
dictional requirements alleviate the problem of service of process on a foreign state. See,
e.g., Rdpublique Arabe Unie v. dame X, Bundesgericht, Feb. 10, 1960, 86 S.B.G. I. 23, 25
(Swit.).
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immunity from service of process. A creative reading of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure might correct the omission of provisions specifically ap-
plicable to foreign nations by permitting service in ways analogous to those
provided for service against private entities, local governments, or the
United States. A more rational approach, however, leading to greater cer-
tainty and to the avoidance of the necessity of having to color facts in order
to fit existing rules, would be to amend the Federal Rules to provide specifically
for service of process on a foreign sovereign and its agents.8 2 Of course,
amending the rules would not dispense with the due process requirement of
minimum contacts, and where such contacts do not exist consent to service
will still be necessary. But beyond this limitation, rules facilitating the service
of process on a foreign state would greatly alleviate the need to find consent
to service of process.
EXTENT OF WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMIZUNITY
Optimum realization of the potential of the doctrine of waiver of sovereign
immunity to increase the competence of domestic courts is a function not
only of the latitude employed in finding certain acts to constitute waiver, but
also in the breadth accorded the waiver once found - e.g., to how broad a class
of disputes will the waiver apply. Those courts and commentators which have
accepted the doctrine of prior waiver of immunity have never questioned the
ability of a foreign sovereign to limit its express contractual waiver to specified
disputes as it sees fit. In such cases the problem of scope of waiver is reducible
to one of contractual interpretation. It is in those cases where a sovereign has
entered a general appearance as plaintiff or defendant or where a state has
tacitly waived its immunity prior to suit that the greatest difficulty in measuring
the scope of waiver arises. This issue has been most frequently discussed in
American and European courts in the context of counterclaims against a
foreign sovereign plaintiff.8 3 Although the courts of Belgium and France 84 have
on occasion allowed indirect counterclaims - "a counterclaim arising out of
facts or transactions extrinsic to those upon which a complainant's claim is
82. For a suggestion that consul generals ought to be subject to service of process for
the purpose of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign State see Comment, 42
CORNEL L.Q. 521, 534 (1957).
[T]here is no general rule of international law, or United States law, expressly or
impliedly prohibiting service of process upon a diplomatic agent so long as lie is niot
required to appear in court or is otherwise not prevented from performing his duties,
Griffin, supra note 77, at 12.
83. See cases cited in Harvard Research in International Law, Competcnce of Courts
in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. Surp. 455, 509-26 (1932).
84. See, e.g., L'Etat de Perou v. Kreglinger, Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, Aug. 13,
1857, [1857] P.B. 11. 348 (Bel.); Letort v. Gouvernement Ottoman, Tribunal Civil de la
Seine, April 24, 1914, 5 REVuE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA LOCOMOTION AL'RIENNn
142 (1914) (Fr.). The two cases cited here are noteworthy in that the court in each gave




based"8 5 - Continental practice often limits the claims which may be asserted
against a sovereign plaintiff to those arising out of the transaction upon which
suit is brought 86 The argument for restricting counterclaims has been strongly
stated by Anzilotti:
It is, in effect, absurd that the State which brings an action can find itself
exposed... in the same proceedings .. in such a manner that any uni-
lateral request can open the way to indefinite and unforeseeable disputes.P
The United States Supreme Court, in contrast to the European courts, has
endorsed a broad doctrine of scope of waiver in National City Bank v. Republic
of China.88 China sued the Bank to recover $200,000 deposited by the Shanghai-
Nanking Railway Administration, an official agency of China. The Bank
counterclaimed for $1,600,000 due it on two treasury notes in default. Although
the Court recognized that fiscal management is within the category of immune
activities reserved by the Tate Letter, it dismissed this consideration as irrele-
vant in view of the fact that the State Department had not indicated that rec-
ognition of the counterclaim would embarrass our friendly relations with
China. To limit counterclaims to those based on the subject matter of the
sovereign's suit - the former American rule - was thought by the Court
to be too indeterminate and capricious. On the grounds of "fair dealing" -
the Bank should not be required to pay its debts to China so long as China
does not pay its debts to the bank - the bank's counterclaim was allowed
to offset China's recovery 8 9
The holding in National City Bank would seem to imply that the essential
rationale of sovereign immunity is avoidance of the harassment of being
brought before a foreign court. Only this view of the doctrine of immunity
would allow the.adjudication of a clairn to which the sovereign would normally
be immune. By the very terms of the restrictive theory, however, the question
85. Harvard Research in International Law, stPra note 83, at 490.
86. Id. at 523-26.
87. Anzilotti, La denande reconventionelle en procdure internationale, 57 CLunnr
857, 870 (1930) (author's translation). Anzilotti argues for the admissibility of the counter-
claim only when the connection between it and the principal claim is so dose that justice
requires the determination of both claims simultaneously.
88. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
89. The National City Bank case presents a bizarre reversal of the roles of the judi-
ciary and the executive. The doctrine of restrictive immunity was developed by a judicial
process in the Continental courts. As applied, both in Europe and in the United States, the
executive is often allowed the prerogative of overruling the assertion of jurisdiction de-
manded by the doctrine of restrictive immunity. In this case, however, the Court refers to
the judicial doctrine by reference to the Tate Letter - a pronouncement of the Depart-
ment of State - but overrules its application on policy grounds: essential justice and for-
eign relations. Moreover, the exceptions traditionally made by the Department of State
are by way of restraining the Court from its exercise of jurisdiction. In no case has the
State Department acted in a converse manner, nor should it be permitted to do so. And
for a court so solicitous of foreign policy and friendly relations between nation-, the state-
ment of China's position is somewhat surprising: "It wants our law free . from the
claims of justice." 348 U.S. at 361-62.
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of immunity is dependant upon the character of the dispute as well as the fear
of harassment. Moreover, if the implications of the Court's opinion were
carried to their logical conclusion, as no court has yet done, the results would be
wholly inconsistent with the concepts of restrictive immunity and waiver.
The ability of the sovereign to condition its prior waiver of jurisdictional im-
munity would be nonexistent: a sovereign limiting its waiver of immunity to
disputes arising from commercial shipping activities would be held to have
consented to jurisdiction over a claim on an unrelated sales contract, and even
on a public loan. In addition, a plaintiff who obtained jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign with respect to claims arising from a private act would be allowed
to amend his complaint to include claims based upon public acts, even though
immunity would normally protect the sovereign in these latter activitiesY0
That the sovereign in each of the preceding hypotheticals appears as a
party defendant rather than as a plaintiff should make no theoretical differ-
ence if the overriding concern is, as is expressed by the Court in National
City Bank, justice and fair dealing. It might be argued that a distinction should
follow from the fact that a sovereign plaintiff willfully invokes the jurisdiction
of the Court.91 But the proposition that this willful submission to jurisdiction
is also a willful submission to the adjudication of all claims to which the
foreign sovereign may be subject is a fiction: the bringing of an action should
be read as a willful waiver of immunity only to the extent necessary to de-
termine the sovereign's claim and other claims based upon the underlying
transaction. Nor is there any reason why a prior waiver of immunity should
be subject to qualification and a waiver by general appearance not. The Su-
preme Court is saying, in effect, that a state may not enter an appearance in
court "free from the claims of justice," but that it may by its prior conduct
effectively limit the extent of its waiver.
The result reached in National City Bank may be desirable if somehow
limited so as not to include more remote counterclaims involving activities
jure imperii. But as stated the result only lends confusion to the application
of and the theoretical bases for the restrictive doctrine of the Tate Letter."
Unless the Supreme Court is able to limit the scope of the submission to ad-
judication resulting from a suit by a foreign state, the restrictive doctrine will
be severely undermined.98 An alternative approach to the issue of extent of
waiver, suggested by the Harvard Research in International Law,94 would
90. Moreover, cross actions might be asserted with third party plaintiffs allowed to
appear in any action in which jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign was established.
91. In one sense the suit brought by China can hardly be termed willful; there was no
other way to get the money purposely withheld from it.
92. Although foreign policy is important, restrictive immunity is a judicial doctrine
to be applied by the courts, and the doctrine must - even if it is to be subject to excep.
tions imposed by the State Department - be reasonably certain.
93. In the context of diplomatic immunities, it has never been seriously asserted that
a foreign diplomat who brings suit in a domestic court on a private matter waives his im-
munity with respect to unrelated cross actions.
94. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 83, at 517-18.
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allow counterclaims -against a foreign sovereign not only when they relate
to the transaction central to the original suit, but also when they relate to
acts jure imperii with respect to which immunity has been waived, and to any
acts with respect to which the foreign sovereign is not entitled to claim im-
munity. Such a rule would avoid both confusing and undermining the restrictive
immunity doctrine, and it would obviate the necessity to resort to fictional
notions of consent apparent in the National City Bank decision.
The extent of any waiver of sovereign immunity can be measured not only
in terms of the different disputes with respect to which immunity from juris-
diction has been waived, but also in terms of the extent of immunity vaived
within a single dispute - is immunity from execution waived along with im-
munity from jurisdiction? The doctrine of sovereign immunity has traditionally
incorporated a distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity
from execution.95 In general the restrictive theory has been confined to im-
munity from jurisdiction; immunity from execution has been considered
absolute, although, in the words of one commentator, the justification for such
special treatment "bears no relation to any logic of a strictly juridical order."00
Absolute though it may be, immunity from execution, like its jurisdictional
counterpart, is susceptible to waiver.9 7 Questions of waiver of sovereign im-
munity from execution, of course, may arise independently from questions of
waiver of jurisdictional immunity, and in such cases the principles for deter-
mining the existence and extent of each are the same. A more difficult prob-
lem, however, is posed by the cases where an initial waiver of immunity from
jurisdiction is alleged to import a waiver of immunity from execution.
95. See, e.g., Socifross v. Union des Rdpubliques Socialistes Sovidtiques, Cour d'Appel
d'Aix-en-Provence, Dec. 9, 1938, [1939] Dalloz Priodique II. 65, 67-6 (Fr.); Dexter
& Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jaravagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally
Lalive, L'immuniti de juridiction des Etats et des organisations infernalionales, 84 REcu.
DES Couns 205, 272-81 (1953).
96. Freyria, Les limites de Fninnuniti de juridiction et d'ex cution des Elals Itrangcrs,
40 REVUE CRrQUE DE Dnorr iNTERATIONAL Pnsv- 449, 469 (1951)
97. Implied waiver of immunity from execution is usually found in the context of
actions concerning rights in immovables. Continental courts have not hesitated to hold that
an interest in real property in the forum state represents in itself an implied waiver of
immunity from execution - provided the property is not used for diplomatic purposes. See,
e.g., Etat de Suide v. Petrocochino, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, Oct. 30, 1929, [1930]
Dalloz Hebd. 15 (Fr.). For a case illustrating tacit waiver of immunity from execution in
a commercial context, see Etat Roumain v. Socit6 A. Pascalet et Cie, Tribunal de Com-
merce de Marseille, Feb. 12, 1924, [1924] Dalloz Hebd. 260 (Fr.). English courts do not
recognize tacit waiver of jurisdictional immunity and, therefore, take a similar approach
to immunity from execution. See notes 45-45 sipra and accompanying te.x-t.
The Tate- Letter recognizes that a foreign state is not immune with respect to rights
in real property, but it is not clear whether this denial of immunity is meant to apply to
immunity from execution as well as from jurisdiction. See Tate Letter, 26 DEeT STATE
BuLn. 984 (1952). In a well-known decision, a New York court adopted the English
rather than the Continental position before the United States espoused restrictive immuni-
ty. Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E2d 81 (1939).
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This problem of dual waiver was recently considered by the Fourth Circuit
in Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A., v. Motor Vessel Ciudad De La
Habana.98 Flota Maritima entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Banco
Cubano Del Comercio Exterior, a Cuban corporation organized by the Re-
public of Cuba for the advancement of her foreign trade; this agreement was,
in effect, a bareboat charter of eight vessels owned by Banco. Subsequently,
Banco, aware that Flota Maritima considered it to be in breach of their agree-
ment, sold the vessels to the Cuban government on June 9, 1959. A few days
later, Flota Maritima filed a libel in rem against one of the ships, the Habana,
at the time in a Baltimore shipyard, and a libel against Banco in personam
with a clause for foreign attachment of the Habana. On October 27, 1960,
the Republic of Cuba appeared in the action, claimed ownership of the Habana,
and filed an answer to the libel. Neither Banco nor the Cuban government filed
any paper with the district court raising or suggesting the defense of sovereign
immunity until May 11, 1962 - almost three years after the initial filing of
Flota Maritima's libel.
Although requested to do so, the State Department presented no suggestion
of immunity.09 The Court of Appeals interpreted this failure to act as an indi-
cation that in adjudicating the dispute the court would not be "venturing into
a sensitive area in which its possible decrees might gravely embarrass the
Executive's conduct of the Nation's foreign affairs."100 The court, affirming
the district court, then held that by entering a general appearance in 1959
unaccompanied by a claim of immunity, Cuba had waived its sovereign im-
munity from jurisdiction and manifested consent to suit. Moreover, despite
the fact that the court recognized the distinction between immunity from exe-
cution and jurisdictional immunity, and, notwithstanding the position of the
State Department that the property of a foreign state is always immune from
execution, the court held that the Republic of Cuba had implicitly waived
its immunity from execution. The failure prior to a general appearance to
protest or to reserve a right to protest the seizure of property attached in order
to obtain jurisdiction implied a waiver of immunity from both jurisdiction
and execution.
The Fourth Circuit's finding of waiver of immunity from execution was
based upon a radical departure from the limited function previously accorded
attachment for purposes of jurisdiction by the courts and the executive. Ameri-
can courts, guided by the State Department, have recently taken the position,
in two important cases, that absolute immunity from execution obtains even
where execution is sought on property previously attached for purposes of
jurisdiction. In Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank,101 plaintiff brought
98. 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964).
99. The court does not state when the request was made to the State Department,
nor when, if ever, the State Department responded to the request. 335 F2d at 623.
100. Ibid.
101. 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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suit upon a note issued by the Soviet government as part of a commercial
agreement. The case first arose in 1955 when the State Department apparently
denied a request of the Soviet government for a suggestion of immunity from
attachment for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction over funds of the Soviet
Union on deposit with the Chase Bank. The USSR did not appear in the
action and a default judgment was entered. Then, in 1957, Weilamann brought
a second action in a New York court to obtain possession of the funds previ-
ously attached. The New York Civil Practice Act does not clearly demarcate
what stages of in rem proceedings constitute jurisdiction or execution, 02 and
the court, acting on the State Department's suggestion of immunity from exe-
cution, dismissed the complaint. In Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l
Corp.,10 3 another New York case, the court relied on a State Department letter
to the Attorney General:
The Department is of the ... view that, where under international law
a foreign government is not immune from suit, attachment of its property
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction is not prohibited. In many cases
jurisdiction could probably not be obtained otherwise. But property so
attached... cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment.....o0
The Fourth Circuit, however, departed from the doctrine represented by
these cases and introduced a wholly new approach to this area of sovereign
immunity:
It is quite immaterial to [the question of waiver of immunity] ... that,
should the libelant ultimately prevail on the merits, the court's decrees
can be enforced only through a sale of the ship. The immunity of the
sovereign's property, if it exists, is from seizure; there is no immunity
of such property from sale following a seizure which was, at the time
or later became, unobjectionable and unassailable. The seizure, of course,
was for the purpose of execution as well as of jurisdiction, and the right
to assert immunity in both aspects was lost when the general appearance
was entered without mention of it.'05
Whatever the analytic validity of the propositions advanced by the court, they
are unprecedented in prior law, and Cuba could not have foreseen that absent
timely protest it would be held to have waived immunity from execution with
respect to the attached property. For this reason, the court's finding of waiver
of immunity is a fiction - particularly invidious because the court neither
recognized nor articulated it as such. Insofar as execution is to be favored,
a court might make known a policy of finding waiver following certain con-
duct and require the foreign sovereign to take positive steps to avert waiver;
alternatively, a court might modify directly the doctrine of absolute immunity
from execution, perhaps along the lines of the restrictive theory. At the least,
if the court in Flota Maritima wanted to render execution coextensive with
102. See generally Myers, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
Inter ational Law, 54 Am. J. IWr'L L. 632, 641 (1960).
103. 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961).
104. 15 App. Div. 2d at 116,222 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
105. 335 F.2d at 627.
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attachment for purposes of jurisdiction, it should not have done so without
first considering the underlying question of the propriety of execution in general.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM EXECUTION
The American doctrine of absolute immunity from execution, as developed
by case law, not only is mechanically applied, but also is often self-contra-
dictory and inconsistent with its underlying principles. Indeed, the result in
the leading American case on absolute immunity from execution, Dexter &
Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen,'0o ignored the accepted rationale
for the doctrine. The Royal Administration of the Swedish State Railways,
an entity indistinct from the Swedish government, brought a damage action
for breach of a contract to sell coal. The seller, counterclaimed on the same
contract and received judgment in its favor. The district court vacated an
order of attachment following execution, and the Second Circuit affirmed:
"The clear weight of authority in this country, as well as that of England and
Continental Europe, is against all seizures, even though a valid judgment has
been entered."'1 7 The policy behind immunity from execution has long been
the maintenance of good international relations by not depriving the sovereign
of resources necessary to ensure the operation of its public services and the
performance of its public engagements. Dexter & Carpenter, however, in which
execution was directed in part against moneys deposited in a New York bank
specifically to cover the payments for the coal, 08 is on these facts inconsistent
with the implications of this policy. It is wholly consonant with a sovereign's
control of its essential resources to allow, in a suit on a contract, execution
against those assets which the sovereign has earmarked for the performance
of that contract. 09 Indeed, England, which follows the absolute theory in an
almost devout manner, has allowed suit and execution in similar circumstances
where the agent holding the property for the sovereign rather than the sovereign
itself, was named as defendant in the action.110
106. 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930).
107. Id. at 708. The approach employed in this case to establish the doctrine of ab-
solute immunity from execution has been facetiously referred to by more than one coin-
mentator as a "nose-counting" approach. Such an approach is not totally without authority;
Chief Justice Marshall recommended it in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 191 (1815) : "The decisions of the courts of every country show how the law
of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and will be considered in adopt-
ing the rule which is to prevail in this." Id. at 198. Whatever the validity of such an ap-
proach at the time of the decision of the Boyle case, its applicability today must be ques-
tioned in view of the fact that many Continental courts allow execution today.
108. 43 F.2d at 706. The bank holding the Swedish agency's funds was also made at
defendant, but execution against these funds was, nevertheless, not allowed.
109. l.monon suggests that the earmarking of assets in such a manner constitutes an
implied in fact waiver. L~monon, L'inmunits de juridiction et d'exlention forele des
Etats 6trangers, 44 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL I, 5, 24 (1952).
110. Larivi~re v. Morgan, [1871] L.R. 7 Ch. App. 550, rezfd on other grounds, [1875]




One limit which American courts have placed on absolute immunity from
execution and which has resulted in the mechanical application of the doctrine,
is the rule that property does not constitute a "part of the sovereignty" and
is subject to execution unless it is actually possessed as well as owned by the
sovereign."' Possession has been held, however, to include domestic bank
accounts in the name of the sovereign.n 2 And the sovereign's acquisition of
possession may take place within United States territory if accomplished
without violation of local law.US On the other hand, property owned by the
sovereign but possessed by an autonomous corporate entity - even if that
entity is owned and controlled by a foreign state - is not entitled to immunity
from execution if held in a private or commercial capacity rather than by the
corporation as agent for the state in a governmental or public capacity . 4 Yet
it is questionable whether the fact of actual possession in the name of the
government ought to be the decisive factor in questions of immunity from
execution. If a ship owned by a sovereign is seized and sold to satisfy a debt
of the sovereign, the effect on the sovereign will be the same whether that ship
is operated by a private concern or government-owned company, or by seamen
who draw their pay directly from the government itself.M Nor, on the other
hand, is it at all clear why funds deposited in a private bank for commercial
purposes are deemed to be in the possession of sovereign and therefore immune
from execution, whereas funds turned over to a government corporation may
be used to satisfy a judgment against the corporation, or indeed the sovereign." 0
111. See, e.g., The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15 (1869); Compania Espanola v. The
Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
112. Bradford v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
113. Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938).
114. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.
1929) ; Coale v. Sodt6 Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S2d
825 (1940).
115. It has been argued that if a ship is owned by a government corporation, or by
a trading agency that functions like a corporation, there exists an implied waiver of im-
munity from execution. "The device of the trading enterprise as a separate legal entity vas
to be understood as separating, for purposes of legal liability, that enterprise from the
general status of government." FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUcrURE OF INTMrNATIONAL
LAW 350 (1964). This approach was applied in principle in Swiss Fed Rys. v. United
States, 112 F. Supp. 357 (Ct. CL 1953), where the Court had to consider the ability of the
plaintiff, a branch of entity of Switzerland, to bring suit in United States courts. "True, it
is not a government corporation in the same form that we have them, but it has practically
the same powers [under Swiss law], including the right to sue and be sued." Id. at 362.
It is surely no less reasonable to argue that the use of property for commercial purposes,
no matter what the organizational practice, imports implied submission of the property to
execution as well as jurisdiction of appropriate courts.
116. In contraposition to its treatment of noncorporate agencies and commercial bank
accounts of foreign sovereigns, the United States has taken a liberal view with regard to
political subdivisions of a foreign state. In Molina v. Com. Reg. Del Mercado de Henequen,
91 N.J.L. 382 (1918), the Department of State refused to recommend immunity from ex-
ecution for the defendant,
for the reason that political subdivisions of a foreign government engaging in or-
dinary commercial transactions must be regarded as subjecting themselves to the
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A more rational theory of immunity from execution and one consistent
with the underlying policy would result from recourse to the principles of re-
strictive immunity. If a foreign state conducting commercial activities is to
be subject to the jurisdiction of national courts because of the overriding
interests of justice between the parties, the 'economic welfare of the forum
state, and the needs of international commerce, then it must be further ac-
knowledged that these same interests require that at least the commercial assets
of the foreign state also be subjected to the laws of national courts. Mere ad-
judication without remedy is a sorry way to protect interests such as these.111
As a major European case allowing execution has stated:
Whereas confidence is the essential condition of international as well as
national transactions, the course of the former cannot but find itself ad-
vantageously affected by the fact that a judgment ... [enforces such a
transaction] and assures, moreover, the execution on foreign assets which
are in Belgium. One should not lose sight of the fact that if [foreign
assets] ...can be seized here, it is because of transactions which .. .
[the foreign state] has thought it expedient to carry on here.'"
A test looking to whether the intended or actual use of the assets in question
is commercial or noncommercial would, of course, entail definitional difficulties
similar to those encountered by the courts in applying the restrictive theory
of immunity from jurisdiction. But if a workable distinction is developed, both
the interests of private parties and those of states in international trade will
be safeguarded with minimum interference to the sovereign's use of its essential
resources.
Authority and practical considerations found in the current practice of states
can also be marshalled in support of a policy which allows execution, at least
obligations arising from commercial transactions if they are also to reap the benefits
and enjoy the rights of trade.
Id. at 385. There seems to be no reason why the same considerations of international rela-
tions and noninterference with government, or sovereign, functions should not militate in
favor of immunity in the case of political subdivisions as well as in the case of unincor-
porated state trading agencies. The Continental courts have, in fact, taken the sensible
position of applying the same criteria to both political subdivisions and sovereign states
themselves. See, e.g., Feldman v. Etat de Bahia, Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, Nov. 22, 1907,
[1908] P.B. II. 55 (Bel.) ; Etat de Ceara v. Dorr, Cour de Cassation, Oct. 24, 1932, [1933]
Dalloz Pdriodique I. 196 (Fr.).
117. A judgment against a foreign state without execution does possess more than
moral value. The foreign state is under great pressure in today's world to pay its just
debts. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text. Even if the state does not willingly
settle the claim, the private judgment creditor may be able to enlist the aid of his own
state to secure payment of the judgment through diplomatic channels. Unfortunately, such
a solution possesses serious disadvantages. The decisions made by the claimant state -
how hard to press the claim of its national, or whether to press it at all - are based hi
large part on internal and external political considerations totally alien to the merits of the
private judgment creditor's claim. See Carabiber, Le Concept des immunitfs de juridielion
doit-il 91re rezvs et dans quel sens?, 79 CLUNET 440, 474 (1952).
118. Socobelge v. Etat hell6nique, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951, (1953]
S. IV. 1, 10 (Bel.) (author's translation).
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against commercial assets." 9 Numerous bilateral treaties,' ° conventions '-
and national statutes 122 provide for execution against the property of a foreign
state in certain circumstances, possibly including assets devoted to public
purposes. In addition, many European courts have allowed execution where
the sovereign is acting in a commercial capacity itself 10 or as agent for one
of its nationals.12 4 Although United States courts, with one notable exception,125
have not permitted forced execution against the property of a foreign sovereign
without a finding of waiver, they have allowed affirmative nonmonetary relief.
In Mexico v. Raskm 6 for example, Mexico brought an action to recover pos-
session of a patrol boat owned and used by it in its sovereign capacity. Rask,
who had possession, claimed that he was entitled to a lien on the vessel until
he was paid for the repair work which he had performed. The boat was re-
turned to Mexico on bond and the lien enforced.
If the decisions vesting in a private litigant ownership or an ownership
interest in a sovereign's property have not caused great international strife
- and they have not 127 - there seems to be no reason why assets held by
the foreign sovereign in the forum state for commercial purposes should not
be subject to execution.12 Where execution has been carried out against com-
119. See generally SwEENEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 46-51.
120. E.g., Treaty between Hungary and Switzerland signed at Budapest, June 27,
1950, art. 15 of whichis quoted at [1956] I. S.B.G. 87; Treaty between France and Russia,
Dec. 29, 1945, arts. 8, 10, 11, 36 REVUE C.rIIQUE Ds uRorr iNTER;ATizo;AL PmfV 468, 470-
71 (1947).
121. E.g., Brussels convention, April 10, 1926, art. I, 176 L.N.T.S. 199, 205 (1937).
122. E.g., Greece, the Law of Necessity 1519) 1938, art. 1, § 1, 3 REvuE HLltIIQUoE
Da DRorr INTERNA'iOALI 331 (1950). For a discussion of the role of national statutes in
Switzerland, see Royaume de Gr ce v. Banque Julius Bar & Cie., Bundcsgericht, June 6,
1956, [1956] 82 (I) S.B.G. 75 (Swit.). See also ALLEN, op. cit. mipra note 4, at 262-63
n.66.
123. See, e.g., Union des Ripubliques Socialistes Soviftiques v. Association France-
Export, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), Feb. 19, 1929, [1930] S. I. 49 (Fr.) ; Socobelge v.
Etat hellinique, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951, [1953] S. IV. I (Bel.);
Ripublique Arabe Unie v. dame X, Bundesgericht, Feb. 10, 1960, 86 I. S.B.G. 23 (1960)
(Swit.).
124. See, e.g., Procureur G6n&al v. Vestwig, Cour de Cassation, Feb. 5, 1946, [1947]
S. I. 137 (Fr.).
125. A Florida state court has held that property of a sovereign which is not directly
related to activities jure imperli is subject to execution.
It would not be compatible with the principles of judicial powers of a sovereign
nation if funds deposited as private funds in a private bank in this country, particu-
larly if derived, used, or intended to be used in business type of activities here, would
be clothed in a veil radiating foreign sovereign.
Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1961).
126. 118 Cal. App. 21, 4 P.2d 981 (1931).
127. The Socobelge case did cause a great international uproar, but there the moneys
sought to be executed against were Marshall Plan funds then in Belgium, but destined for
Greece.
128. To clarify the intentions of the parties, multilateral or bipartite treaties such as
the ones prevalent on the Continent today might be entered into. See note 120 supra.
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mercial property in Europe - even without formal treaty sanction - no dis-
ruption of international relations seems to have resulted. Thus in Flola Mar.
tima, it would seem that execution against the vessel located in the United
States, devoted to commercial purposes, and directly connected with the con-
tract sued upon, should have been allowed even if no waiver had been found.
Such a result is greatly to be preferred from the standpoint of international
law to the more artificial solution of Rask. The orderly process of judicial de-
cision and execution gives less ground for complaint than self-help.12
Indeed, the commercial-noncommercial distinction, which has proved to be
such an elusive measure of the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign, need not stand as an immovable barrier to execution against non-
commercial property so long as other means are employed to protect the legiti-
mate interests of the foreign sovereign. If the sovereign is given notice in ad-
vance and the opportunity of posfing bond in lieu of the seizure of specific
property, there is no reason why even property held in connection with activi-
ties jure imperii might not also be made subject to execution.18 0 Of course, if
the litigation concerns the title to any specific property devoted to a nonpublic
use, there is no need for advance notice and execution should follow determi-
nation of the dispute.
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
Any appraisal of American practice in the law of sovereign immunity is
misleading to the extent that it ignores the intervention of the executive in
the application of these doctrines. For this intervention often leads to the
distortion of the results which would otherwise follow if the courts alone were
to apply the doctrines of immunity from jurisdiction and execution and of
waiver. Most states allow the executive to veto execution against property of
a foreign sovereign where disruption of international relations might be oc-
casioned by such execution. In fact, Italian 131 and Greek 182 courts cannot
129. The possibilities for abuse under Mexico 'v. Rask and National City Bank i. Re-
public of China are manifest. For under the doctrine of self-help they encourage the situa-
tion where,
if a foreign sovereign brings suit in the United States, the defendant can purchase
at par or discount any claim against that sovereign, even one of the highest public
character ... and use it as a defense to offset the sovereign's claim.
Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 LAW & CoN'ruMr. PRoD,
369, 395 (1959). Under Rask, moreover, a private party could simply seize a foreign sov-
ereign's property to insure the satisfaction of his legitimate claim against that sovereign.
130. No unfair hardship could be said to be visited upon the foreign country in light
of the fact that the suggested measures follow judgment. In the unlikely event, moreover,
that the foreign country is insolvent, there is no doubt that the State Department would
intervene to protect its assets. And even if bond were not posted, seizure of specific assets
would be necessary only in the nature of a conservatory attachment to ensure against the
foreign country's removing all its property from the United States. This is the substantial
equivalent to the French saisie-conscrvatoire.
131. Law of July 15, 1926, [1926] III Raccolta Ufficiale 2930,
132. See note 122 supra.
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order execution without the prior approval of the executive. In the United
States, the courts have recognized the prerogative of the executive to insist
not only upon immunity from jurisdiction where the restrictive theory does
not permit it, but also on immunity from execution even where waived.lm The
recent case of Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 3 4 is an illustration of foreign policy
considerations which may prompt the State Department to instruct a court to
ignore the doctrine of waiver. The Bahia de Nipe, a Cuban vessel destined
for a Russian port, was sailed instead to Virginia by the barratrous act of her
master and ten of her crew. Immediately, Mayan Lines, possessed of a $500,000
Louisiana consent judgment, in which Cuba specifically waived its immunity
from execution against any of its property in any court, libelled the vessel.
Two days before the Bahia de Nipe had been brought into Virginia vaters,
Cuba had released an Eastern Airlines plane which had been hijacked. Simul-
taneously, the United States had released a Cuban naval vessel that had been
taken to Florida by anti-Castro Cubans.3 5 Cuba had also sent a diplomatic
note to the United States stating that it would discourage hijacking and
promptly release all hijacked United States planes in the future if the United
States were to act in like manner.1 6 In this context, the State Department
"requested" the immediate release of the Bahia de Nipe. 3 7 The Fourth Circuit
then held, in a per curiam opinion, that the State Department's suggestion
was controlling, and ordered the vessel released.
Transient but pressing needs of foreign policy, however, need not work
to the detriment of private parties. Nor should the temporary unavailability
of any property on which to execute permanently deprive a private party
of his remedy. Three protective measures are possible. In any suit against
a foreign sovereign, a private plaintiff may be deprived of his cause of action
if the intervention of the executive prevents final adjudication of the claim
and thus allows either of two statutes of limitation to run: that which controls
the initial bringing of the suit, and that which controls execution following
judgment. The United States Supreme Court has recognized, in the context
of domestic sovereign immunity, that the existence of a claim or lien on prop-
erty does not always depend upon the ability to enforce it.
A claim or lien existing and continuing will be enforced by the courts
whenever the property upon which it lies becomes subject to their juris-
diction and control. 138
133. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). Cf. United States
v. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc., 149 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (State De-
partment intervention too late when chattels already sold at judicial sale).
134. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
135. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of
Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 Coixum L.Q. 461, 464-68 (1963).
136. 45 DE'T STATE BuLT. 407 (1961).
137. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961); FAM,
THE Roix OF Domarsrc COURTS IN TIE INTERNATIONAL LGAL. ORDER 145-58 (1964).
138. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 158 (1868).
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Not only should the claim or judgment continue to exist, however, but the
relevant statute of limitations should be tolled from the date of executive
intervention prohibiting the initial assertion of jurisdiction or the execution
of judgment.
Secondly, if, after jurisdiction has been established, the court is ousted of
the basis for quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction by the State Department's
ordering the release of the res upon which jurisdiction is based or of in per-
sonam jurisdiction by the State Department's ordering the cessation of pro-
ceedings, the court ought to suspend the proceedings without forfeiting its
jurisdiction.139 A series of cases during the First World War supports this
suggestion.140 More recently in Dade Drydock Corp. v. The MIT Mar Caribe,141
a federal court reached a similar result in a converse situation. A ship had
been libelled and attached by Dade. A credit institution of the government of
Cuba had intervened as claimant of the vessel, alleging that it was entitled
to assert sovereign immunity on Cuba's behalf. The hearing before the court
began two weeks after diplomatic relations with Cuba had been suspended.142
The court, perhaps mistakenly, found Cuba ineligible to bring suit, "or to
assert any rights of possession to the vessel in question. 148
However, the action does not abate nor is it subject to dismissal. It
simply means that the action is suspended until the Government of the
Republic of Cuba is again recognized [sic] by the United States ofAmerica.144
Insofar as actual custody of the res is necessary to retain in rem or quasi in
rem jurisdiction, Title 28 of the United States Code should be amended to
allow the State Department's request for release of the property to be honored
without permanently ousting the court of its jurisdiction.1 4
Thirdly, in those cases where judgment has been rendered in favor of the
private party and future remedy is rendered highly improbable by the action
139. Under these circumstances, merely tolling the Statute of Limitations is not satis-
factory, if it does not help to reestablish jurisdiction at a later date.
140. Pleattenberg, Holthaus & Co. v. I.J. Kalman & Co., 241 Fed. 605 (S.D. Ga,
1917); Stumpf v. A. Schreiber Brewing Co., 242 Fed. 80 (W.D.N.Y. 1917); Rothbarth
v. Herzfeld, 223 N.Y. 578, 119 N.E. 1075 (1918).
141. 199 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. i961).
142. Diplomatic relations with Cuba were severed on Jan. 3, 1961.
143. 199 F. Supp. at 874.
144. Ibid.
145. A similar suggestion is made in Comment, 63 YAI.E L.J. 1148, 1167 (1954). How-
ever, a mere continuance, without the release of property attached to obtain in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction, would not be satisfactory from the point of view of the State
Department and the foreign state claiming immunity. If immunity must be granted for a
period of time to protect the foreign sovereign or to ease international tension, it must be
complete immunity for that period. The foreign state must not be required to part with
the use of its property or even to post bond. The very nature of the protection given the
sovereign in such a case suggests the rarity of circumstances calling for State Department
intervention of this order.
[Vol. 74 : 887
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
of the State Department, 14 the United States government should pay the plain-
tiff his just claim and receive in return the right of subrogation, enforceable
through diplomatic channels or 4 7 - if feasible - by subsequent judicial
execution. The argument in favor of such a result has been concisely formu-
lated by the French Conseil d'Etat in Couituas v. l'Etat. 48 The French gov-
ernment had refused to authorize the use of military force to execute a judg-
ment in favor of a Tunisian landowner giving him the right to eject all occu-
pants from his property. The refusal was motivated by a fear of political
disorders that might have followed the ejectment. Couit~as' claim for indemnity
from the French government was upheld:
The ordinary man possessed of a judgment clothed in due form with the
executory formula has the right to rely on the support of the public force
to assure the execution of the title which has thus been delivered to him
... [T]he total and limitless deprivation of enjoyment resulting to the
complainant from the measures taken in his regard have imposed on him,
in the general interest, an injury for which he is entitled to demand
pecuniary reparation.149
CONCLUSION
The presumption of even the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is
that with the exception of a defined class of activities a foreign state is immune
146. This would be the case, for example, if the only property susceptible of execution
- i.e., nondiplomatic property not withdrawn from the country - after the State Depart-
ment has ordered the release of any attached property from the court is of insufficient value
to satisfy the judgment, and the likelihood of other property's coming %ithin the jurisdic-
tion of United States courts is negligible.
147. It has been suggested that the United States government indemnify a private
plaintiff only in tort cases, since the injured party normally does not voluntarily incur the
risk of injury. But in contract cases, it is said, the possibility of the foreign state's breach
is but one of the factors in the bargain. Comment, 63 YALE I.J. 1148, 1164-69 (1954).
There is a fundamental problem in this approach. In the case where the foreign state
waives its immunity from suit and execution in a contract with the private party, the
possibility of breach cannot be taken into account in the bargain for the waiver and the
waiver should be enforced by the courts - assuming no State Department intervention -
if they are not to regress to the English position. See text at notes 45-49 .spra. Moreover,
plaintiffs should be treated equally in both tort and contract actions, if the restrictive
theory's prescription that commercial activities are within the competence of domestic
courts is to have any meaning. One cannot bargain against the possibility of the exigencies
of international relations or the future position of the foreign state calling for State De-
partnent intervention.
The 1954 Comment also suggests that the United States be added as a defendant where
the State Department insists on inminiity before the adjudication of the dispute between
a private party and a foreign State. 63 YALE L.J. at 1167-68. But it is hard to envisage
the United States as a substituted party; it has no knowledge of the true facts of the dis-
pute, and an attempt to acquire the information necessary to litigate the claim from the
foreign State might well annul the desired results of granting immunity from jurisdiction
in the first place.
148. Coaseil d'Etat, Nov. 23, 1923, [1923] S. 111. 57 (Fr.).
149. Id. at 70 (author's translation).
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from suit in domestic courts. The confidence necessary to reverse this pre-
sumption and eventually to abolish sovereign immunity may not develop until
international tribunals become the accepted forum for the resolution of in-
ternational legal disputes. In the interim period, however, in which domestic
courts are the only tribunals practically available, effective adjudication may
best be realized by a broad application of the doctrine of waiver of immunity,
and by allowing execution to follow judgment in all cases. To this end, rules
of national courts should be made flexible enough to accommodate both the
needs of international relations and the requirements of international inter-
dependence, justice and legality.
